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Abstract—In this work, the role of unidirectional limited
rate transmitter cooperation is studied in the case of the 2-
user Z interference channel (Z-IC) with secrecy constraints at
the receivers, on achieving two conflicting goals simultaneously:
mitigating interference and ensuring secrecy. First, the problem
is studied under the linear deterministic model. The achievable
schemes for the deterministic model use a fusion of cooperative
precoding and transmission of a jamming signal. The optimality
of the proposed scheme is established for the deterministic
model for all possible parameter settings using the outer bounds
derived by the authors in a previous work. Using the insights
obtained from the deterministic model, a lower bound on the
secrecy capacity region of the 2-user Gaussian Z-IC are obtained.
The achievable scheme in this case uses stochastic encoding
in addition to cooperative precoding and transmission of a
jamming signal. The secure sum generalized degrees of freedom
(GDOF) is characterized and shown to be optimal for the
weak/moderate interference regime. It is also shown that the
secure sum capacity lies within 2 bits/s/Hz of the outer bound
for the weak/moderate interference regime for all values of the
capacity of the cooperative link. Interestingly, in case of the
deterministic model, it is found that there is no penalty on the
capacity region of the Z-IC due to the secrecy constraints at the
receivers in the weak/moderate interference regimes. Similarly,
it is found that there is no loss in the secure sum GDOF for the
Gaussian case due to the secrecy constraint at the receiver, in
the weak/moderate interference regimes. The results highlight the
importance of cooperation in facilitating secure communication
over the Z-IC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of cooperation between the transmitters/receivers in
interference limited scenarios has been studied extensively in
the context of communication reliability. However, the effect
of the cooperation on communication secrecy has not been
well explored, and the ability to cooperate can have a very
different effect on the achievable rates when there is a secrecy
constraint (e.g., when the transmitted information should not
be decodable at receivers except for the intended receiver)
[1], [2]. Therefore, this paper investigates the tension between
the gain due to cooperation and the loss due to the secrecy
constraints, on the rates achievable in an interference-limited
communication system. In a system operating under secrecy
constrains at receivers, the receivers cannot enhance their own
rates by decoding and canceling the interference, since this
does not preserve the communication secrecy. This leads to the
following fundamental questions: (a) how much interference
can be mitigated through rate-limited transmitter cooperation,
when there are secrecy constraints at receivers, and (b) what is
the corresponding gain in the rate achieved by the cooperation
between transmitters? Answering these questions helps in
understanding the role of cooperation in managing interference
and ensuring secrecy in multiuser scenarios.
The effect of transmitter cooperation on the secrecy capacity
is closely related to the underlying channel model. The channel
model considered in this paper is the Z-IC [3], [4], which is
one of the important information theoretic channel models. In
the Z-IC, only one of the two transmitters causes interference
at the unintended receiver, which is also referred to as a
partially connected IC in [5]. As a practical example, the Z-IC
can model a 2-tier network, where the macro cell user is close
to the edge of the femtocell while the femtocell user is close to
the femto base station (BS). Since the macro BS can typically
support higher complexity transmission schemes, it could use
the side information received from the femto BS to precode its
data to improve its own rate and simultaneously ensure secrecy
at the femtocell user. At the receivers, the macro cell user
could experience significant interference from the femtocell
BS, while the femtocell user receives little or no interference
from the macro BS, leading to the Z-IC as the appropriate
model for the system. Hence, answering the aforementioned
questions in the context of the Z-IC can lead to useful insights
in the 2-tier cellular network mentioned above.
A. Prior work
The IC has been studied extensively with and without
secrecy constraints at the receivers under different settings [6]–
[8]. However, the capacity region of the 2-user Gaussian IC has
remained an open problem, even without secrecy constraint,
except for some specific cases like the strong interference
regime and the very strong interference regime [9], [10]. In
[7], an achievable scheme using random binning is proposed
for the discrete memoryless IC with secrecy constraints at
receivers. A K-user Gaussian IC is considered in [8], and
the achievable scheme uses a combination of interference
alignment along with precoding to ensure secrecy.
It has been shown that cooperation between the transmitters
or receivers in case of IC can improve the overall performance
2of the system, when there is no secrecy constraint at the
receiver [11]–[13]. However, the effect of cooperation on
managing interference and ensuring secrecy in interference
limited scenarios is not well understood. Some of the works in
this direction can be found in [1], [14]. It has been shown that,
with cooperation, it is possible to achieve nonzero secrecy rate
in most of the cases, even when the unintended receiver has a
better channel compared to the legitimate receiver. The effect
of cooperation on the achievable rates for other communication
models with secrecy constraints can be found in [15]–[18].
The Z-IC model has also been studied in existing literature
with and without secrecy constraints [3], [19], [20]. In [3],
lower bounds on the capacity region of the Gaussian Z-IC
for the weak and moderate interference regimes are derived.
In [19], it is shown that superposition encoding with partial
decoding is optimal for a certain class of Z-IC. In [20], the Z-
IC model is considered with secrecy constraints at the receivers
and achievable schemes are obtained for the deterministic and
the Gaussian model in the weak/moderate interference regime.
For the deterministic model, the secrecy capacity region is
characterized. The role of cooperation in the Z-IC without
the secrecy constraint has been investigated in [21]–[23]. In
[21], both the encoders can cooperate through noiseless links
with finite capacities and the sum capacity of the channel
is characterized to within 2 bits of the outer bound. The
role of receiver cooperation in Z-IC is investigated in [22],
[23]. However, the role of limited transmitter cooperation in
managing interference and ensuring secrecy in case of Z-IC
has not been investigated in the existing literature, and is
therefore focus of this work.
B. Contributions
This work considers the 2-user symmetric Z-IC with uni-
directional transmitter cooperation in the form of a rate-
limited link from transmitter 2 (which causes interference) to
transmitter 1 (which does not cause interference), and with
secrecy constraints at receivers. The key challenge here is
to devise techniques for simultaneously canceling interference
and guaranteeing secrecy. First, the problem is solved under
the deterministic approximation of the channel. By motivating
from the results in the deterministic model, an achievable
scheme is derived for the Gaussian channel model, which is
applicable for all the interference regimes.
One of the key techniques used in the achievable scheme
for both the deterministic and Gaussian models is cooperative
precoding performed at transmitter 1, which cancels interfer-
ence at receiver 1 and thereby simultaneously ensures secrecy.
However, the amount of the interference that can be canceled
at the receiver is limited by the rate of the cooperative link.
In the deterministic model, transmission of a jamming signal
along with interference cancelation is required to achieve
the capacity. On the other hand, the achievable scheme for
the Gaussian model uses stochastic encoding in addition to
cooperative precoding and transmission of a jamming signal.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized below:
1) The achievable scheme for the deterministic model uses
a careful combination of transmission of random bits and
cooperative precoding to cancel the interference at the
unintended receiver. The secrecy capacity region of the
Z-IC can be characterized without sharing any common
randomness between the transmitters for all values of the
capacity of the cooperative link. This is in contract to the
case of IC, where sharing common randomness between
the transmitters through the cooperative link improves
the performance of the achievable scheme compared to
the case of sharing data bits only in some cases [1]. It is
also shown that the capacity region of the deterministic
Z-IC does not enlarge if the perfect secrecy constraint at
the receiver is replaced with the weak or strong notion
of secrecy.
2) The achievable scheme for the Gaussian model uses a
combination of stochastic encoding, interference cance-
lation and artificial noise transmission. The novelty in
the achievable scheme lies in fusing stochastic encod-
ing with interference cancelation. In the weak/moderate
interference regime, the secure sum generalized degrees
of freedom (GDOF) is characterized and shown to be
optimal. The secure sum capacity of the Z-IC is also
shown to lie within 2 bits/s/Hz of the outer bound in
the weak/moderate interference regime for all possible
values of the capacity of the cooperative link.
3) The results on the secrecy capacity region of the 2-
user Z-IC without cooperation between the transmitters
can be obtained as special case of the analysis for both
the models. Note that, prior to this work, the capacity
region of the Z-IC for the deterministic model with
secrecy constraints was not fully known, even for the
non-cooperating case [20].
It is shown that limited-rate transmitter cooperation can
greatly facilitate secure communication over the Z-IC in
weak/moderate and high interference regimes. In case of the
deterministic model, it is found, surprisingly, that there is no
penalty on the capacity region of the Z-IC due to the secrecy
constraints at the receivers in the weak/moderate interference
regimes. Thus, the proposed scheme allows one to get secure
communications for free. Similarly, it is found that there is no
loss in the sum GDOF for the Gaussian case due to the secrecy
constraint at the receiver, in the weak/moderate interference
regimes. For the deterministic model, it is found that for every
one bit increase in the capacity of the cooperative link, the
secure sum rate can increase by one bit, in the weak, moderate
and high interference regimes, until the sum rate is saturated
by its maximum possible value. Part of this work has appeared
in [24].
Notation: Lower case or upper case letters represent scalars,
lower case boldface letters represent vectors, and upper case
boldface letters represent matrices.
Organization: Section II presents the system model. In
Secs III and IV, the achievable schemes for the determinis-
tic and Gaussian models are presented, respectively. Sec. V
presents the approximate secure sum capacity characterization
in case of weak/moderate interference regime. In Sec. VI,
some numerical examples are presented to offer a deeper
insight into the bounds. Concluding remarks are offered in
Sec. VII; and the proofs of the theorems are provided in the
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Fig. 1. 2-user Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation (from
transmitter 2 to transmitter 1).
Appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a 2-user Gaussian symmetric Z-IC with unidirec-
tional and rate-limited transmitter cooperation from transmit-
ter 2 to 1, as shown in Fig. 1(a).1 In the Z-IC, only one of the
users (i.e., transmitter 2) causes interference to the unintended
receiver (i.e., receiver 1). The received signal at receiver i, yi,
is given by
y1 = hdx1 + hcx2 + z1; y2 = hdx2 + z2, (1)
where zj (j = 1, 2) is the additive white Gaussian noise,
distributed as N (0, 1). Here, hd and hc are the channel
gains of the direct and interfering links, respectively. The
input signals (xi) are required to satisfy the power constraint:
E[|xi|2] ≤ P . The transmitter 2 cooperates with transmitter 1
through a noiseless and secure link of finite rate denoted by
CG.
The equivalent deterministic model of (1) at high SNR is
given by [11], [20]
y1 = D
q−mx1 ⊕Dq−nx2; y2 = Dq−mx2, (2)
where x1 (x2) is the binary input vector of the deterministic
Z-IC from user 1 (user 2) of length m (max{m,n}); y1 (y2)
is the binary output vector of length max{m,n} (m); D is
a q × q downshift matrix with elements dj′,j′′ = 1 if 2 ≤
j′ = j′′ + 1 ≤ q and dj′,j′′ = 0 otherwise; and the operator
⊕ stands for modulo-2 addition, i.e., the XOR operation. The
deterministic model is also shown in Fig. 1(b).
The deterministic model is a first order approximation of
a Gaussian channel, where all the signals are represented by
their binary expansions. Here, noise is modeled by truncation,
and the superposition of signals at the receiver is modeled by
modulo 2 addition. Hence, the parameters m, n, and C of
the deterministic model are related to the Gaussian symmetric
Z-IC as m = (⌊0.5 logSNR⌋)+, n = (⌊0.5 log INR⌋)+,
and C = ⌊CG⌋. Note that the notation followed for the
deterministic model is the same as that presented in [11]. The
bits ai ∈ F2 and bi ∈ F2 denote the information bits of
transmitters 1 and 2, respectively, sent on the ith level, with
the levels numbered starting from the bottom-most entry.
1The model is termed as symmetric as the links from transmitter 1 to
receiver 1 and transmitter 2 to receiver 2 are of the same strength.
The transmitter i has a message Wi, which should be
decodable at the intended receiver i, but needs to be kept
secret from the other, i.e., the unintended receiver j (j 6= i),
and this is termed as the secrecy constraint. Note that, for
the Z-IC, the message W1 is secure as there is no link from
transmitter 1 to receiver 2. Hence, the goal is to ensure that W2
is not decodable at receiver 1. The encoding at transmitter 1
should satisfy the causality constraint, i.e., it cannot depend
on the signal to be sent over the cooperative link in the future.
The signal sent over the cooperative link from transmitter 2
to transmitter 1 is represented by v21. It is also assumed that
the transmitters trust each other completely and they do not
deviate from the agreed schemes, for both the models.
For the deterministic model, the encoded message at trans-
mitter 1 is a function of its own data bits, the bits received
through the cooperative link, and possibly some random bits,
whereas the encoded message at transmitter 2 is independent
of the other user’s data bits. The bits transmitted on the
different levels of the deterministic model are chosen to be
equiprobable Bernoulli distributed, denoted by B(12 ). The
decoding is based on solving the linear equation in (2) at each
receiver. For secrecy, it is required to satisfy the perfect secrecy
constraint, i.e., I(Wi;yj) = 0, i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j in the
case of the deterministic model [25]. In the later part of the
sequel, it is shown that replacing the perfect secrecy constraint
at receiver with the strong or weak secrecy constraint does not
enlarge the capacity region of the deterministic model.
In the Gaussian case, the details of the encoding and
decoding schemes can be found in Sec. IV. For the Gaus-
sian model, the notion of weak secrecy is considered, i.e.,
1
N
I(W2;y
N
1 ) → 0 as N → ∞, where N corresponds to the
block length [26].
The following interference regimes are considered:
weak/moderate interference regime (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), high
interference regime (1 < α ≤ 2) and very high interference
regime (α > 2), where, with slight abuse of notation α , n
m
is used for the deterministic model and α , log INRlog SNR is used
for the Gaussian model. The quantity α captures the amount
of coupling between the signal and interference.
III. LINEAR DETERMINISTIC Z-IC: ACHIEVABLE
SCHEMES
When there is a high capacity cooperative link from trans-
mitter 2 to transmitter 1, the interference caused at receiver 1
by transmitter 2 can be completely canceled by using the
signal received from transmitter 2 via the cooperative link
at transmitter 1. This cancelation of interference offers two
benefits: it improves the achievable rate, and also ensures
secrecy, since the signal sent by transmitter 2 is no longer
decodable at receiver 1. When the capacity of the cooperative
link is not sufficiently high, it is not possible to design the
precoding to completely eliminate the interference caused by
transmitter 2 at receiver 1. In this case, the transmission of
random bits (i.e., transmission of artificial noise [27], [28])
by transmitter 1 can ensure secrecy of the data bits sent by
transmitter 2 at receiver 1, in turn enabling transmitter 2 to
achieve a higher secure rate of communication. Thus, the
4achievable scheme proposed below uses a carefully designed
combination of interference cancelation and transmission of
random bits depending on the capacity of the cooperative link
C and the value of α. In the following, it is shown that the
corner points of the outer bounds on the secrecy capacity
region of the deterministic model [24] are achievable for
different interference regimes. Hence, the achievable results
stated in Theorems 1-3 correspond to the secrecy capacity
region of the deterministic Z-IC.
A. Weak/moderate interference regime (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
Theorem 1: In the weak/moderate interference regime, i.e.,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the secrecy capacity region of the 2-user deter-
ministic Z-IC with unidirectional and rate-limited transmitter
cooperation is
R1 ≤ m,R2 ≤ m,R1 +R2 ≤ 2m− n+ C. (3)
Proof: In this regime, using Theorem 1 in [24], the
secrecy capacity region of the deterministic Z-IC is upper
bounded as R1 ≤ m, R2 ≤ m, and R1 +R2 ≤ 2m− n+ C.
Thus, the outer bound is characterized by four corner rate pairs
(R1, R2) corresponding to (m, 0), (0,m), (m,m − n + C)
and (m− n+C,m). In the following, an achievable scheme
is proposed to achieve these corner points, thus, achieving
the capacity of the deterministic Z-IC in the weak/moderate
interference regime.
1) Case 1 (R1, R2) = (m, 0) and (R1, R2) = (0,m): To
achieve the point (m, 0), transmitter 1 sends m data bits on the
levels [1 : m] and transmitter 2 remains silent. To achieve the
corner point (0,m), transmitter 2 sends data bits on the levels
[1 : m]. As the data bits sent on the levels [m − n + 1 : m]
are received at receiver 1, transmitter 1 sends random bits
generated from B(12 ) distribution on the levels [1 : n] to ensure
secrecy of the data bits of transmitter 2 at receiver 1.
2) Case 2 (R1, R2) = (m,m−n+C): As data bits sent by
transmitter 1 are not received at receiver 2, it can send m data
bits securely. Transmitter 2 can send at least m− n data bits
securely as the links corresponding to the levels [1 : m − n]
are not present at receiver 1. To transmit at the higher levels
[m− n+ 1 : m− n+C], transmitter 2 shares C cooperative
bits with the transmitter and the transmitter 1 precodes these
cooperative data bits with its own data bits and transmits on
the levels [1 : C]. Transmitter 2 also sends the data bits shared
with the transmitter 1 on the levels [m−n+1 : m−n+C] so
that the data bits of transmitter 2 can be canceled at receiver 1.
This scheme not only cancels the interference, but at the same
time ensures secrecy. Hence, transmitter 2 can achieve a rate
of m− n+ C, while transmitter 1 can achieve a rate of m.
3) Case 3 (R1, R2) = (m − n + C,m): In contrast
to the previous case, the achievable scheme in this case
uses transmission of random bits in addition to interference
cancelation. Transmitter 2 sends data bits on the levels [1 : m]
and shares C data bits [bm−n+1 : bm−n+C ] with transmitter 1.
Transmitter 1 precodes these cooperative data bits with its
own data bits and sends these precoded data bits on the levels
[1 : C]. On the levels [C + 1 : n], transmitter 1 sends random
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Fig. 2. Deterministic Z-IC with m = 5, n = 3 and C = 1.
bits to keep the data of transmitter 2 confidential to receiver 1.2
On the remaining levels [n + 1 : m], transmitter 1 sends its
own data bits. As transmitter 2 does not cause any interference
to the data bits sent on these levels by transmitter 1, receiver 1
can decode these data bits. Hence, transmitter 1 achieves a rate
of m− n+ C, while transmitter 2 achieves a rate of m.
The achievable schemes for the two cases (Case 2 and 3)
are also illustrated in Fig. 2.
Remarks:
• The derivation of the outer bound in [24] does not use the
secrecy constraint at the receiver. The proposed schemes
can achieve the four corner points of the outer bound,
and hence, the secrecy constraints at the receivers do not
result in any penalty on the capacity region. Thus, the
capacity region of the deterministic Z-IC is characterized
with and without secrecy constraints for all the values of
C.
• When 0 < α ≤ 1, both the users can achieve the
maximum rate of m simultaneously if C ≥ m, otherwise
they cannot.
B. High interference regime (1 < α < 2)
Theorem 2: In the high interference regime, i.e., 1 < α <
2, the secrecy capacity region of the 2-user deterministic Z-IC
with unidirectional and rate-limited transmitter cooperation is
R1 ≤ m,R2 ≤ 2m− n,R1 +R2 ≤ m+ C. (4)
Proof: In this regime, using Theorem 2 in [24], the
secrecy capacity region of the deterministic Z-IC is upper
bounded as R1 ≤ m, R2 ≤ 2m− n, and R1 +R2 ≤ m+ C.
This outer bound is characterized by four corner rate pairs
(R1, R2) corresponding to (m, 0), (0, 2m − n), (m,C) and
(C+n−m, 2m−n). The achievability of the first two corner
points is trivial. Note that, for achieving these two corner
points, sharing of data from transmitter 2 to transmitter 1 is
not required. In the following, achievability of the remaining
two corner points is shown.
2When C = n, the interference caused by transmitter 2 can be completely
eliminated at receiver 1, and it is not required to send random bits from
transmitter 1.
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1) Case 1 (R1, R2) = (m,C): To achieve this corner point,
transmitter 1 sends data bits on the levels [1 : m] and hence,
it can achieve a secrecy rate of m. The transmitter 2 shares
[b1 : bC ] to transmitter 1 through the cooperative link. Trans-
mitter 1 precodes (XOR) the cooperative data bits received
from transmitter 2 with its own data bits, and transmits them
on the levels corresponding to [n − m + 1 : n − m + C].
Precoding in this way not only cancels the interference caused
by the data bits transmitted on the levels [n−m+1 : n−m+C]
at transmitter 2, but also ensures secrecy. Hence, transmitter 2
can send C data bits securely.
2) Case 2 (R1, R2) = (C + n−m, 2m− n): In this case,
as the links corresponding to levels [1 : n − m] are only
present from transmitter 2 to receiver 1, transmitter 2 does
not send any data bits on these levels. Hence, transmitter 1
can send data bits on the levels corresponding to [1 : n−m]
and these data bits will be received without any interference at
receiver 1. When C > 0, the achievable scheme uses interfer-
ence cancelation in addition to transmission random bits. Bits
transmitted on the levels [n−m+ 1 : n−m+C] will cause
interference at receiver 1. The interference can be eliminated
by precoding the data bits on levels [n−m+ 1 : n−m+C]
at transmitter 1 with the data bits of transmitter 2, received
through cooperation. Transmitter 2 can also send data bits
securely on the levels corresponding to [n−m+C+1 : m] with
the help of transmission of random bits by transmitter 1 on
the levels [n−m+C+1 : m]. Transmitter 2 remains silent on
the remaining top levels, as transmission of data bits on these
levels violates the secrecy condition. Hence, the corner point
(C + n−m, 2m− n) is achievable by the proposed scheme.
The achievable schemes for the two cases are illustrated in
Fig. 3. Note that, to achieve the maximum possible rate of
2m − n for user 2, it is not required to use the cooperative
link, and transmitter 1 sends random (jamming) bits on the
levels [1 : m]. As all the corner points are achievable, any
points between these corner points is also achievable by time
sharing. Hence, the capacity region of the Z-IC in the high
interference regime is characterized.
Remarks:
• When C = 0 and 1 < α < 2, if user 1 achieves
the maximum rate of m, then user 2 cannot achieve
any nonzero secrecy rate. This is in contrast to the
weak/moderate interference case, where user 1 achieves
the maximum rate of m, while user 2 achieves the rate
of m− n even without cooperation.
• When 1 < α < 2 and C ≥ 2m− n, transmitters 1 and 2
can simultaneously achieve the maximum rates of m and
2m− n, respectively.
• In general, the principle behind the achievable schemes to
achieve the corner points (m,m−n+C) and (m,C) in
the weak/moderate and high interference regimes, respec-
tively, is precoding of data bits at transmitter 1 using the
data bits of transmitter 2 received on the cooperative link
to cancel interference and ensure secrecy. On the other
hand, the achievability of the corner points (m−n+C,m)
and (n−m+C, 2m−n) in the weak/moderate and high
interference regimes, respectively, requires transmission
of random bits by transmitter 1 to ensure that the signal
from transmitter 2 remains secure, in addition to precod-
ing data bits received from transmitter 2 with its own data
bits.
C. Very high interference regime (α ≥ 2)
Theorem 3: In the very high interference regime, i.e., α ≥
2, the secrecy capacity of the 2-user deterministic Z-IC with
unidirectional and rate-limited transmitter cooperation is
R1 ≤ m,R2 = 0. (5)
Proof: The outer bound on the rate of user 2 in Theorem 3
[24] shows that user 2 cannot achieve any nonzero secrecy
rate irrespective of the capacity of the cooperative link. Thus,
transmitter 1 can send data bits on the levels [1 : m], while
transmitter 2 remains silent. This characterizes the capacity of
the deterministic Z-IC in the very high interference regime.
Interestingly, it turns out that the capacity region of the Z-IC
does not change if the perfect secrecy constraint at the receiver
is replaced with the strong or the weak notion of secrecy. This
result is stated in the following Theorem.
Theorem 4: The secrecy capacity region of the determin-
istic Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation satisfies
the following
Cperfect = Cstrong = Cweak, (6)
where Cperfect, Cstrong and Cweak correspond to the capacity
regions of the 2-user deterministic Z-IC with unidirectional
transmitter cooperation guaranteeing the perfect, strong and
weak secrecy constraints at the receivers, respectively.
Proof: Any communication scheme satisfying the perfect
secrecy condition will automatically satisfy the strong and
weak secrecy conditions. Similarly, a communication scheme
satisfying strong secrecy will automatically satisfy the weak
secrecy condition. Hence, the following holds
Cperfect ⊆ Cstrong ⊆ Cweak ⊆ Cweakouter , (7)
where Cweakouter corresponds to the outer bound on the capacity
region of the Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation
and weak secrecy constraints at the receivers. The achievable
results in Sec. III are obtained under the perfect secrecy
constraints at the receivers. On the other hand, it is not difficult
6to show that the outer bounds on the capacity region in
[24] do not change if perfect secrecy constraint is replaced
with weak secrecy constraint.3 As the achievable rate regions
(i.e., Cperfect) match with the outer bounds on the capacity
region (i.e., Cweakouter ), the relation in (6) holds.
IV. GAUSSIAN Z-IC: ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
For the Gaussian case, a unified achievable scheme is
proposed, which is applicable in the weak, moderate and
high interference regimes. The achievable scheme is based
on the cooperative precoding performed at the transmitters to
cancel the interference at the unintended receiver along with
stochastic encoding and transmission of artificial noise. When
the capacity of the cooperative link is not sufficiently high, it
is not possible to share the entire message of transmitter 2
with receiver 1 through the cooperative link. Hence, the
interference caused at receiver 1 by transmitter 2 cannot be
completely eliminated. Thus, stochastic encoding performed at
transmitter 2 and artificial noise transmission by transmitter 1
can provide additional randomness to increase the secrecy rate
of user 2.
The achievable scheme is inspired by the approaches used
for the deterministic model in Secs. III-A and III-B. However,
the extension of schemes proposed for the deterministic model
to that for the Gaussian model is non-trivial. This is primarily
because, in the deterministic case, noise is modeled by trunca-
tion and superposition of signals modeled as XOR operation
does not account for the carry over of bits across levels, in
contrast to the Gaussian model.
The achievable scheme for the deterministic model is ex-
tended to the Gaussian model as follows. Since there is no
cooperative link from transmitter 1 to transmitter 2, transmit-
ter 1 cannot share its message with transmitter 2 for coop-
eration. The message of transmitter 1 intended to receiver 1
is inherently secure, as there is no link from transmitter 1 to
receiver 2. This translates to having non-cooperative private
message wp1 ∈ Wp1 = {1, 2, . . . , 2NR1} at transmitter 1, and
for each message, it transmits a codeword from a Gaussian
codebook of size 2NR1 . Next, for the transmission of data by
transmitter 2, recall that, in the deterministic case, the data
bits sent by transmitter 2 on the lower levels [1 : m − n] are
inherently secure in the weak/moderate interference regime
(Sec. III-A). To enable secure transmission of data bits on
the higher levels (specifically, levels [m − n + 1 : m] in the
weak/moderate interference regime and levels [n−m+1 : n]
in the high interference regime), transmitter 2 needs the
assistance of transmitter 1. That is, transmitter 1 needs to
precode the data bits received through the cooperative link,
or needs to send a jamming signal so that the other user’s
data bits remain undecodable at receiver 1. To translate this
scheme to the Gaussian case, the message at transmitter 2
is split into two parts: a non-cooperative private message
wp2 ∈ Wp2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2NRp2} and a cooperative private
message wcp2 ∈ Wcp2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2NRcp2}. Transmitter 2
3This can be shown by using 1
N
I(Wi;y
N
j ) ≤ ǫ, i 6= j, (weak secrecy)
as a measure of secrecy in the derivation of the outer bounds, instead of
I(Wi,yj) = 0 (perfect secrecy).
encodes the non-cooperative private message into xNp2 using
stochastic encoding. A stochastic encoder is specified by
a matrix of conditional probability fp2(xp2,k|wp2), where
xp2,k ∈ Xp2 and wp2 ∈ Wp2.
For the cooperative private message, transmitters 1 and
2 precode the message wcp2 cooperatively such that the
codeword carrying the cooperative private message is com-
pletely canceled at the non-intended receiver. This cooperative
precoding also helps ensure secrecy for the cooperative private
message. The details of the encoding and decoding process
of the achievable scheme are presented in the following
subsection.
A. Encoding and decoding
For the non-cooperative private part, transmitter 1 generates
a codebook Cp1 containing 2NR1 i.i.d. sequences of length
N and its entries are i.i.d. random variables from N (0, Pp1).
Transmitter 2 generates two codebooks as follows. For the
non-cooperative private message, it generates a codebook Ccp2
containing 2N(Rp2+R
′
p2) codewords of length N . The entries
of the codebook are drawn at random from N (0, Pp2). The
2N(Rp2+R
′
p2) codewords in the codebook Cp2 are randomly
grouped into 2NRp2 bins, with each bin containing 2NR
′
p2
codewords. Any codeword in Cp2 is indexed as xNp2(wp2, w′p2)
for wp2 ∈ Wp2 and w′p2 ∈ W ′p2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2NR
′
p2}. To
send wp2, transmitter 2 selects w′p2 uniformly random from
the set W ′p2 and transmits the codeword xNp2(wp2, w′p2). For
the cooperative private message, transmitter 2 generates a
codebook Ccp2 consisting of 2NRcp2 i.i.d. sequences of length
N . The entries of the codebook are chosen at random from
N (0, Pcp2). This codebook is made available at transmitter 1.
To send a message (wp2, wcp2), transmitter 2 superimposes
the cooperative codeword xcp2(wp2) with the non-cooperative
codeword xNp2(wp2, w′p2) as
xN2 (wp2, w
′
p2, wcp2) = x
N
p2(wp2, w
′
p2) + hdx
N
cp2(wcp2). (8)
The following power constraint is required to be satisfied at
transmitter 2:
Pp2 + h
2
dPcp2 ≤ P, (9)
where Pp2 and Pcp2 are parameters to be chosen later.
Transmitter 1 performs precoding as mentioned in (10), so
that the codeword carrying the cooperative private message
of transmitter 2 is canceled at receiver 1. This is termed as
cooperative precoding. Transmitter 1 also adds artificial noise
(xNa1) generated from a Gaussian distribution to increase the
achievable secrecy rate for transmitter 2. Thus, transmitter 1
sends
xN1 (wp1, wcp2) = x
N
p1(wp1)− hcxNcp2(wcp2) + xNa1. (10)
The following power constraint is required to be satisfied at
transmitter 1:
Pp1 + h
2
cPcp2 + Pa1 ≤ P, (11)
where Pp1 and Pa1 are parameters to be chosen later.
The decoding at receivers is performed as follows. Re-
ceiver 1 looks for a unique index wˆp1 such that (yN1 ,xN1 (wˆp1))
7is jointly typical. Receiver 2 looks for a unique tuple
(wˆp2, wˆ
′
p2, wˆcp2) such that (yN2 ,xNp2(wˆp2, wˆ′p2),xNcp2(wˆcp2)) is
jointly typical. Decoding errors at the receivers can occur in
one of two ways. First, the receiver may not be able to find
any codeword that is jointly typical with the received sequence.
Second, a wrong codeword is jointly typical with the received
sequence.
Based on the above encoding and decoding strategy, the
following theorem gives a lower bound on the secrecy capacity
of the Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation.
Theorem 5: For the Gaussian Z-IC with unidirectional
transmitter cooperation and secrecy constraints at the receivers,
the achievable rate region is given by
R1 ≤ I(xp1;y1),
R2 ≤ min {I(xp2,xcp2;y2), I(xp2;y2|xcp2) + min{CG,
I(xcp2;y2|xp2)}} −R′p2, (12)
where R′p2 = I(xp2;y1|xp1).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remarks:
1) The term R′p2 in Theorem 5 accounts for the rate sacri-
ficed by transmitter 2 in confusing receiver 1 to keep the
non-cooperative message of transmitter 2 secret. As the
capacity of the cooperative link increases, the loss in rate
due to the stochastic encoding decreases, as more power
can be assigned to the cooperative private message.
2) When CG = 0 and α ≥ 1, the transmission of artificial
noise by transmitter 1 is required along with stochastic
encoding for user 2 to achieve a non-zero secrecy rate.
By evaluating the mutual information terms in (12) and
taking convex closure of the union of set of regions obtained
over different codebook parameters (Pp1, Pa1, Pp2, Pcp2), the
following lower bound on the secrecy capacity region is
obtained.
Corollary 1: Using the result in Theorem 5, the following
rate region is achievable
Rs , convex closure of

 ⋃
0≤(θi,βi,λi)≤1, i=1,2
RsZ-IC(θi, βi, λi)

 ,
(13)
where
RsZ-IC ,
{
(R1, R2) : R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2dPp1
1 + h2dPa1 + h
2
cPp2
)
,
R2 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + h2dPp2 + h4dPcp2)−R′p2,
R2 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + h2dPp2) + min{CG,
0.5 log(1 + h4dPcp2)} −R′p2
}
, (14)
where R′p2 , 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2cPp2
1+h2
d
Pa1
)
, Pcp2 ,
λ2
(λ1+λ2)h2d
P2,
Pp2 ,
λ1
λ1+λ2
P2, Pp1 ,
θ1
θ1+θ2
P ′, Pa1 ,
θ2
θ1+θ2
P ′, P ′ ,
(P1 − h2cPcp2)+, P1 , β1P , and P2 , β2P .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remarks:
1) In Corollary 1, the parameter βi (0 ≤ βi ≤ 1) acts as
a power control parameter for transmitter i (i = 1, 2).
The parameters θi and λi act as rate splitting parameters
for transmitter i.
2) When C = 0 (or CG = 0), the system reduces to the
2-user Z-IC (Gaussian Z-IC) without cooperation, which
was studied in [20]. The achievable results in Theorem 2
(Theorem 3) in [20] can be obtained as a special case of
achievable results for the deterministic model (Gaussian
model) in Theorem 1 (Theorem 5), by setting C = 0
(CG = 0) and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Note that, for both the
deterministic and Gaussian models, achievable schemes
on the secrecy capacity region have not been addressed
in the literature for the high interference regime (α > 1),
even when C = 0 (CG = 0).
V. APPROXIMATE SECURE SUM CAPACITY
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE GAUSSIAN Z-IC IN THE
WEAK/MODERATE INTERFERENCE REGIME
A. Secure sum generalized degrees of freedom (GDOF)
As mentioned earlier, the capacity region for many multiuser
scenarios has remained an open problem, even without secrecy
constraints at the receivers. Due to this, there has been an
active research interest in approximate characterizations of the
capacity. In this context, the notion of generalized degrees of
freedom (GDOF) has been used as a proxy for the capacity
at high SNR and INR, for the IC, without the secrecy con-
straint [6]. A natural extension of this to the secure sum GDOF
is given by
dsum(κ, γ) = lim
SNR→∞
Csum(SNR, INR)
0.5 logSNR , (15)
where κ = lim
SNR→∞
log INR
log SNR , γ = limSNR→∞
CG
0.5 log SNR and Csum
is the secure sum capacity of the 2-user Gaussian Z-IC with
unidirectional transmitter cooperation. To characterize the sum
GDOF, hd = 1 is assumed without loss of generality, and the
following power allocation is used.
Pp1 =
P
2
, Pp2 =
1
h2c
, Pcp2 =
1
2
(
P − 1
h2c
)
and Pa1 = 0.
(16)
It is also assumed that h2cP > 1, so that the above power
allocation is always feasible. The motivation for this power
allocation is as follows. The power for the message of trans-
mitter 1 is set as P2 to ensure that user 1 achieves the maximum
GDOF of 1. Recall that, in the weak/moderate interference
regime, transmitter 2 can send data bits securely on the lower
levels [1 : m − n], as the links corresponding to these levels
are not present at receiver 1. In other words, the data bits
transmitted on the lower levels [1 : m−n] of transmitter 2 are
received at or below the noise floor of receiver 1. Hence, in
the Gaussian case, the power for the non-cooperative private
message is chosen such that it is received at the noise floor of
the receiver 1. Due to this power allocation, the loss in rate
of user 2 due to stochastic encoding is R′p1 = 0.5 bits/s/Hz.
8Hence, the loss in achievable secrecy rate due to stochastic
encoding does not scale with SNR and INR. The cooperative
private message of transmitter 2 is assigned with a power of
1
2
(
P − 1
h2c
)
.
In the following theorem, the secure sum GDOF is charac-
terized using the power allocation in (16) for all values of CG
in the weak/moderate interference regime.
Theorem 6: The optimal secure sum GDOF of the 2 user
Gaussian Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation in
the weak/moderate interference regime is
dsum(κ, γ) = min {2, 2− κ+min (γ, 1)} . (17)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remarks:
1) The outer bound on the sum rate in Theorems 4 and 5
are used to obtain outer bound on the sum GDOF [21],
[29], [30]. Both the bounds give the same results in
terms of GDOF. Note that the derivation of the outer
bound in Theorem 4 does not use the secrecy constraint
at receiver 1 [21]. Hence, there is no penalty in the sum
GDOF due to the secrecy constraint at receiver in the
weak/moderate interference regime for all values of CG.
2) When γ = κ, dsum(κ, γ) = 2. Hence, both the users
can achieve the maximum GDOF of 1 simultaneously.
Similarly, in the deterministic model, when C = n
(or C
m
= α), both the users can achieve a maximum
rate of m simultaneously.
As the proposed scheme with power allocation in (16)
can achieve the optimal sum GDOF, the achievable sum rate
should be within finite number of bits from the outer bound.
In the following subsection, the gap between the achievable
sum rate and outer bound is characterized.
B. Finite bit gap result on the sum rate capacity
In this section, the sum rate capacity of the 2-user Gaussian
Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation is shown to
lie within 2 bits/s/Hz of the outer bound in the weak/moderate
interference regime (INR < SNR) for all values of CG. Note
that this gap is the worst case gap. To show the finite gap
result, the power allocation in (16) is used in Corollary 1 to
obtain a lower bound on the secure sum rate capacity. This
result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 7: The secure sum rate capacity of the 2-user
Gaussian Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation
lies within 2 bits/s/Hz of the sum rate outer bound in the
weak/moderate interference regime for all values of CG, i.e.,
Rsum ≤ Csum ≤ Coutersum ≤ Rsum + 2, (18)
where Rsum and Coutersum correspond to the lower bound and up-
per bound on the secure sum capacity (i.e., Csum), respectively.
Proof: See Appendix D.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the following sections, some numerical examples are
presented for the deterministic and Gaussian cases, to get
insights into the system performance in different interference
regimes.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy capacity region of the deterministic Z-IC with (m,n) =
(5, 3). This corresponds to the weak interference regime.
A. Deterministic Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooper-
ation
In Fig. 4, the capacity region given in Theorem 1 is plotted
for m = 5, n = 3 and various values of C. When C = 0, there
are three interfering links [m− n+ 1 : m] from transmitter 2
to receiver 1. These links act as a shared data channel, i.e.,
they are usable only by one of the two transmitters for data
transmission. It is interesting to note that under the secrecy
constraint at receiver 1, user 2 can achieve 5 bits per channel
use (bpcu), when user 1 achieves 2 bpcu. This is due to the
fact that transmitter 1 can send a jamming signal (random bits)
on the levels [1 : n], which enables user 2 to send data bits
securely on the higher levels [m − n + 1 : m] in addition to
transmitting on the lower levels [1 : m − n]. Recall that the
links corresponding to the lower levels [1 : m−n] do not exist
at receiver 1. Hence, user 1 has to sacrifice a rate of n = 3
bpcu, which can also be observed from the sum rate constraint
in Theorem 1. For C ≥ 3, the capacity region becomes the
square region, where both users can simultaneously achieve
m = 5 bpcu. Note that the outer bound used to establish
the capacity region in Theorem 1 does not use the secrecy
constraints at the receivers. Therefore, Fig. 4 is also a plot of
the capacity region without secrecy constraints. In Fig. 5, the
capacity region given in Theorem 2 is plotted for m = 4, n =
5 and various values of C. When C = 0 and user 1 achieves
the maximum rate of m, i.e., 4 bpcu, user 2 cannot achieve any
nonzero secrecy rate. When user 2 achieves the maximum rate
of 2m−n, i.e., 3 bpcu, user 1 achieves a nonzero secrecy rate
of 1 bpcu. When C = 1 and user 1 achieves the maximum
rate of 4 bpcu, from the sum rate constraint in Theorem 2,
user 2 can achieve a rate of 1 bpcu. On the other hand, when
user 2 achieves a rate of 3 bpcu, user 1 can achieve a rate of 2
bpcu. Note that both the users can achieve a nonzero secrecy
rate with cooperation, in contrast to the non-cooperating case.
The improvement in the capacity region with increase in value
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Fig. 5. Secrecy capacity region of the deterministic Z-IC with (m, n) =
(4, 5). This corresponds to the high interference regime.
of C is clear from the figure.
In Figs. 4 and 5, when C > 0, a part of the interference
can be canceled at the unintended receiver, which leads to a
gain in the sum rate. The need for sending a jamming signal
also decreases with increase in the value of C. Hence, as C
increases, the capacity region enlarges.
In Fig. 6, the secure sum capacity of the deterministic Z-
IC is plotted against α for different values of C using the
result in Sec. III. In this case, the secure sum capacity is
normalized by m. When C = 0, as α increases, the sum
capacity decreases and becomes constant for α > 1. As the
value of the cooperative link increases, in the initial part of
the weak interference regime, both the users can achieve the
maximum rate, i.e., m. This is due to the fact that capacity
of the cooperative link is sufficient to cancel the interference
at receiver 1. However, with further increase in the value of
C, the secure sum capacity starts decreasing. In the very high
interference regime, user 2 cannot achieve any nonzero secrecy
rate irrespective of the value of C.
B. Gaussian Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation
In Figs. 7 and 8, the achievable results in Corollary 1 are
plotted along with the outer bounds obtained in [29], [30]
for different values of CG, in the weak and high interference
regime, respectively. When CG > 0, a part of the interference
can be canceled at the unintended receiver, which leads to
a gain in the rate due to cooperation. In particular, the
improvement in the sum rate performance for both the cases
can be observed from these figures. As the capacity of the
cooperative link increases, less power is assigned to send the
non-cooperative private message of transmitter 2, which in turn
also reduces the loss in rate due to stochastic encoding.
In Fig. 9, the secure sum GDOF stated in Theorem 6 is
plotted against α for various value of γ. From the figure, it
can be noticed that with cooperation it is possible for both the
users to achieve the maximum GDOF, i.e., 1, in the initial part
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Fig. 6. Secure sum capacity for the deterministic Z-IC. Rate is normalized
with m.
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Fig. 7. Achievable rate region for the Gaussian model: P = 100, hd = 1
and hc = 0.5.
of the weak/moderate interference regime, if the capacity of
the cooperative link scales with SNR. In these cases, there is
no loss in terms of GDOF due to the secrecy constraint at the
receiver.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work explored the role of limited-rate unidirectional
transmitter cooperation in facilitating secure communication
over the 2-user Z-IC. For the deterministic case, the achievable
scheme uses a combination of interference cancelation and
transmission of random bits. The secrecy capacity region of
the deterministic model is characterized over all interference
regimes and for all values of C. The study of the deterministic
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Fig. 8. Achievable rate region for the Gaussian model: P = 100, hd = 1
and hc = 1.5.
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Fig. 9. Secure sum GDOF in the weak/moderate interference regime for the
Gaussian model. In the plot, γ corresponds to the scaling of the capacity of
the cooperative link with respect to 0.5 log SNR.
model gave useful insights for the Gaussian case. The pro-
posed scheme for the Gaussian model uses a fusion of coopera-
tive precoding for interference cancelation, stochastic encoding
and artificial noise transmission for ensuring secrecy of the
unintended message at the receiver. The secure sum GDOF
of the Gaussian Z-IC is characterized for the weak/moderate
interference regimes. The sum rate capacity is also shown to
lie within 2 bits of the outer bound in the weak/moderate
interference regime for all values of the capacity of the
cooperative link, CG. It is found that cooperation between the
users can facilitate secure communication over Z-IC except
for the very high interference regime. It is also found that
secrecy constraint at the receiver does not hurt the capacity in
the weak/moderate interference regime for the deterministic
model. Similarly, it is found that there is no loss in the secure
sum GDOF in the weak/moderate interference regime due to
the secrecy constraint at the receiver.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 5
The proof involves analyzing the error probability at the
decoders for the proposed encoding scheme, along with equiv-
ocation computation. The equivocation computation is neces-
sary to choose how much of its own rate transmitter 2 must
sacrifice to keep the non-cooperative private message secret.
One of the main novelties of the proof lies in precoding of the
cooperative private message of transmitter 2 at transmitter 1,
which cancels the interference at receiver 1 and at the same
time ensures secrecy of the cooperative private message.
1) Error probability analysis: For receivers 1 and 2, define
the following events
Ei , {(yN1 ,xNp1(i)) ∈ TNǫ (PY1Xp1)}, (19)
Fijk , {(yN2 ,xNp2(i, j),xNcp2(k)) ∈ TNǫ (PY2Xp2Xcp2)}, (20)
where TNǫ (PY1Xp1) denotes the set of jointly typical sequences
y1 and xp1 with respect to P (y1,xp1) and TNǫ (PY2Xp2Xcp2)
denotes the set of jointly typical sequences y2, xp2 and
xcp2 with respect to P (y2,xp2,xcp2). Without loss of gen-
erality, assume that transmitters 1 and 2 send xN1 (1, 1) and
xN2 (1, 1, 1), respectively. An error occurs if the transmitted
and received codewords are not jointly typical, or a wrong
codeword is jointly typical with the received codewords. Using
the union of events bound and asymptotic equipartition prop-
erty (AEP), it can be shown that λNe1 = P (Ec1
⋃∪i6=1Ei) ≤
P (Ec1) +
∑
i6=1
P (Ei)→ 0 as N →∞ provided
R1 ≤ I(xp1;y1). (21)
Similarly, the probability of error at receiver 2, i.e.,
λNe2 = P (F
c
111
⋃∪(i,j,k) 6=(1,1,1)Fijk) ≤ P (F c111) +∑
(i,j,k) 6=(1,1,1)
P (Fijk)→ 0 as N →∞ provided
Rp2 +R
′
p2 ≤ I(xp2;y2|xcp2), (22)
Rcp2 ≤ I(xcp2;y2|xp2), (23)
Rp2 +R
′
p2 +Rcp2 ≤ I(xp2,xcp2;y2). (24)
Due to rate-limited cooperation, the following condition is
required to be satisfied for the cooperative private message
Rcp2 ≤ CG. (25)
Hence, using (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), and R2 = Rp2+Rcp2,
(12) is obtained.
In the following, R′p2 is determined for ensuring secrecy
of the non-cooperative private message of transmitter 2 at
receiver 1.
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2) Equivocation computation: Writing H(W2|yN1 ) =
H(Wp2|yN1 ) + H(Wcp2|yN1 ,Wp2), and noting that
H(Wcp2|yN1 ,Wp2) = H(Wcp2) because the codeword
carrying the cooperative private message is completely
canceled at receiver 1 and the cooperative private message is
chosen independent of the non-cooperative private message
at transmitter 2. Hence, to ensure secrecy of the message of
transmitter 2, it is required to show the following
H(Wp2|yN1 ) ≥ NRp2 −NǫN . (26)
The term H(Wp2|yN1 ) can be lower bounded as follows
H(Wp2|yN1 )
≥ H(Wp2|yN1 ,xNp1),
(a)
= H(Wp2)− I(Wp2;yN1 |xNp1),
(c)
= H(Wp2)− I(Wp2;yN1 |xNp1) + I(Wp2;yN1 |xNp1,xNp2),
= H(Wp2)− h(yN1 |xNp1) + h(yN1 |xNp1,Wp2)
+ h(yN1 |xNp2,xNp1)− h(yN1 |xNp2,xNp1,Wp2),
= H(Wp2)− I(xNp2;yN1 |xNp1) + I(xNp2;yN1 |xNp1,Wp2),
≥ H(Wp2)−NI(xp2;y1|xp1)
+ I(xNp2;y
N
1 |xNp1,Wp2)−NǫN , (27)
where (a) is obtained using the relation: I(Wp2;yN1 |xNp1) =
H(Wp2|xNp1) − H(Wp2|yN1 ,xNp1) and the fact that Wp2 is
independent of xNp1; and (c) is obtained using the fact that
Wp2 → (xp1,xp2) → y1 forms a Markov chain and hence,
I(Wp2;y
N
1 |xNp1,xNp2) = 0.
The third term in (27) is simplified as follows
I(xNp2;y
N
1 |xNp1,Wp2) = H(xNp2|Wp2)−H(xNp2|yN1 ,xNp1,Wp2),
= NR′p2 −H(xNp2|yN1 ,xNp1,Wp2).
(28)
To bound the entropy term in (28), consider the decoding of
W ′p2 at receiver 1 assuming that a genie has provided Wp2
as side-information to receiver 1. For a given Wp2 = wp2,
assuming that w′p2 was sent by transmitter 2 and receiver 1
knows yN1 = yN1 and xNp1 = xNp1, receiver 1 tries to decode
w′p2. Receiver 1 declares that j was sent if (xNp2(wp2, j),yN1 )
is jointly typical and such j exists and is unique. Otherwise
an error is declared. Using AEP, it can be shown that the
probability of error can be made arbitrarily small if
R′p2 ≤ I(xp2;y1|xp1). (29)
When the condition in (29) is satisfied and for sufficiently
large N , using Fano’s inequality, the following is obtained
H(xNp2|yN1 ,xNp1,Wp2 = wp2) ≤ δ1. (30)
Using the above, the last term in (28) is bounded as follows:
H(xNp2|yN1 ,xNp1,Wp2)
=
∑
wp2
P (wp2)H(x
N
p2|yN1 ,xNp1,Wp2 = wp2),
≤ Nδ1. (31)
Hence, given Wp2, the codeword chosen for the non-
cooperative private message for transmitter 2 is a good code
for receiver 1 with high probability if the condition in (29) is
satisfied.
Using (28) and (31), (27) reduces to the following
H(Wp2|yN1 ) ≥ NRp2 −NI(xp2;y1|xp1) +NR′p2 −NǫN .
(32)
By choosing R′p2 = I(xp2;y1|xp1) − ǫ, secrecy of the non-
cooperative private message is ensured and (26) is obtained.
Substituting this choice into (32) leads to (12).
B. Proof of Corollary 1
The first term in (12) is evaluated as follows
R1 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2dPp1
1 + h2dPa1 + h
2
cPp2
)
(33)
where the power allocations are as mentioned in the statement
of the theorem. The second term in (12) is simplified as follows
R2 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + h2dPp2 + h4dPcp2)−R′p2, (34)
where R′p2 = 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2cPp2
1+h2
d
Pa1
)
.
The last term in (12) is simplified as follows
R2 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + h2dPp2) + min
{
CG, 0.5 log(1 + h
4
dPcp2)
}
−R′p2. (35)
Taking convex closure of (33) and the minimum of (34) and
(35) over different values of θi, βi and λi, the achievable
secrecy rate in (13) is obtained. The parameters θi, βi and λi
are defined in the statement of the Corollary. This completes
the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 6
Using Corollary 1 and the power allocation in (16), the
lower bound on the sum rate reduces to
R1 +R2
≤ 0.5 log
(
1 +
P
4
)
+min
{
0.5 log
(
1 +
1
2h2c
+
P
2
)
,
0.5 log
(
1 +
1
h2c
)
+min
{
CG, 0.5 log
(
1 +
1
2
(
P − 1
h2c
))}}
− 0.5 log 2,
= 0.5 logSNR +min
{
0.5 logSNR, 0.5 log SNR
INR
+min {CG, 0.5 logSNR}}+O(1),
or dsum(κ, γ) = min{2, 2− κ+min (1, γ)}. (36)
Hence, the achievable sum GDOF becomes
dsum(κ, γ) = min {2, 2− κ+ γ} . (37)
To establish the GDOF optimality of the proposed scheme,
considers the following outer bounds on the sum rate. As
the individual rates of each user is upper bounded by
0.5 log (1 + SNR), a trivial outer bound on the sum rate is:
R1 + R2 ≤ log (1 + SNR). Hence, the outer bound on the
secure sum GDOF becomes dsum(κ, γ) ≤ 2.
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Next, consider the outer bound on the sum rate in Theorem 4
in [21]
R1 +R2
≤ 0.5 log(1 + SNR + INR + 2
√
SNR · INR)
+ 0.5 log
(
1 +
SNR
1 + INR
)
+ CG,
≤ 0.5 log (1 + 3SNR + INR) + 0.5 log (1 + SNR + INR)
− 0.5 log (1 + INR) + CG,
= log SNR− 0.5 log INR + CG +O(1),
or dsum(κ, γ) ≤ 2− κ+ γ. (38)
Next, starting from the sum rate bound in Theorem 5 in [29]
and using a similar procedure as the above, it can be shown
that dsum(κ, γ) ≤ 2−κ+γ. Hence, although (unlike Theorem 4
in [21]) Theorem 5 in [29] was derived accounting for the
secrecy constraint, both the theorems lead to the same outer
bound on the GDOF. Finally, the outer bound on the secure
sum GDOF becomes
dsum(κ, γ) ≤ min {2, 2− κ+ γ} . (39)
It is easy to verify that the outer bound on the GDOF in
(39) coincides with the achievable GDOF in (37). Hence, the
proposed scheme is GDOF optimal, and this completes the
proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 7
Using Corollary 1 and the power allocation in (16), the
lower bound on the sum rate reduces to
R1 +R2
≥ 0.5 log
(
1 +
Pp1
1 + h2cPp2
)
+ min

0.5 log(1 + Pp2 + Pcp2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
,
0.5 log(1 + Pp2) + min{CG, 0.5 log(1 + Pcp2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2


− 0.5 log(1 + h2cPp2). (40)
To determine the gap, the following exhaustive cases are
considered.
1) When I1 ≤ I2: In this case, (40) reduces to
R1 +R2
≥ 0.5 log
(
1 +
P
4
)
+ 0.5 log
(
1 +
1
2h2c
+
P
2
)
− 0.5 log 2,
(41)
> 0.5 log(1 + SNR) + 0.5 log(1 + SNR)− 2. (42)
A trivial outer bound on the sum rate is R1 + R2 < log(1 +
SNR). Hence, comparing this outer bound on the sum rate
with (42), the gap is at most 2 bits/s/Hz.
2) When I1 > I2 and 0.5 log(1+Pcp2) > CG: In this case,
the lower bound on the sum rate in (40) reduces to
R1 +R2 ≥ 0.5 log
(
1 +
SNR
4
)
+ 0.5 log
(
1 +
SNR
INR
)
+ CG
− 0.5 log(1 + h2cPp2),
> 0.5 log(1 + SNR) + 0.5 log
(
1 +
SNR
INR
)
+ CG
− 1.5. (43)
To calculate the gap, the following outer bound on the sum
rate in Theorem 5 is used [29].
R1 +R2 ≤ log (1 + SNR)− 0.5 log (1 + INR) + CG. (44)
Subtracting (43) from the sum rate outer bound in (44), it can
be seen that the gap is at most 2 bits/s/Hz.
3) When I1 > I2 and 0.5 log(1+Pcp2) ≤ CG: In this case,
the lower bound on the sum rate reduces to (41), for which
the gap is shown to be at most 2 bits/s/Hz.
Hence, the sum rate capacity of the Z-IC with unidirec-
tional transmitter cooperation and the secrecy constraints at
the receivers is within 2 bits/s/Hz of the outer bound. This
completes the proof.
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